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The Lawyer and The American System t
BRENDAN

F.

BROWN *

A discussion of the relation of the lawyer to the American system
will be of benefit to the legal profession, the public, and the historian
of broad interests, concerned with the functional aspects of history.
For the legal profession it should be a source of great inspiration toward
future achievement, making its members aware of herculean participation
of lawyers of other days in the momentous task of building the American
system. Certainly the horizon opened up by such a subject should spur the
American bar toward the goal of continuing to make the American system
workable. Considered from a selfish point of view, the American legal
profession would do well to dispel popular distrust against it by an educational
program to show the importance of the lawyer in the establishment and
t Reprinted by permission from The North Carolina Law Review, December,
1945. Material of a similar nature was presented in a radio broadcast over Station
WINX on August 26, 1945, as a public service of the American Bar Association and
WINX, in cooperation with the District of Columbia Bar Association.
Members
participating in the panel were:
Mr. William T. Hannan, Member of the District of Columbia Bar and former
Chairman of the Junior Bar Conference of the American Bar Association of the
District of Columbia;
Professor George A. Cassidy, Instructor in Cemmercial Law, Georgetown School
of Foreign Service;
Mr. James F. Reilly, Commissioner of Public Utilities;
Dr. James J. Hayden, Dean, Columbus University Law School;
Mr. Joseph D. Bulman, Member of the District of Columbia Bar; and
Dr. Brendan F. Brown, Author of this article.
* Professor of Law and Acting Dean of the School of Law, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C.
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expansion of the American system, and in its preservation and continued success. It is true that in every generation there have been lawyers who have
deviated from the high traditional ideals of the profession in the sphere of
public service by concentrating solely upon the narrow field of prediction of
legal rights and liabilities, and partisan advocacy for gain. But it is the
duty of the bar to correct distorted pictures of such exceptional deviations.
Sections of the American public are still not completely informed of
the valuable services which have been and are being performed by the legal
profession in the cause of maintaining the civic, political and economic life
of the nation. There is need of publicizing the opportunities offered gratis
to the indigent by an organized legal aid movement. The public will benefit,
as well as the bar, by a well worked out program of efficient public relations, if properly presented by influential lawyers' organizations.
The story of the American system could well be related from points
of view other than that of the lawyer. The functional aspects of the
narrative can probably be best stressed, however, by placing the lawyer in
the center of the panorama. The sciences of theology, philosophy, politics
and economics, and those learned in these intellectual disciplines, contributed
essential ingredients to the great experiment which resulted in the American
system, but it remained for the lawyer to construct the formulas which preserved the balance between the various components of the American system,
such as between national and local, political and economic authorities
respectively, between popular sovereignty and the binding force of custom,
and between individual and group rights and interests. Such formulas have
always been reducible in ultimate analysis to rules of law.'
Precision of expression requires that definite meaning content be
postulated for the expressions "lawyer" and "American system," since diverse
usage has made these word-symbols amorphous. The choice of meaning has
been dictated by the adoption of the largest generic sense consistent with
commonly accepted usage. It has also been determined by a priori perferences
based on what is significant in the American system and in the sphere of the
legally skilled.
In this connection, the term "lawyer" will include judges and jurists,
as well as lawyers in the narrow and technical sense of legal practitioners. The
subcategories of "lawyer," namely, practitioner, judge and jurist are distinguishable but not exclusive. While practicing lawyers are fundamentally
interested in winning cases by analytical recourse to law considered apart
from morals and political and economic policy, jurists are primarily engaged,
from a financially disinterested point of view, in the study and reform of a
legal system or systems, surveyed from historical, philosophical, sociological,
and institutional levels. Judges combine in the judicial process the elements
1O'Mahoney, The Lawyer, the Constitution, and the Modern World (1944)

Ind. L. J. 1 at 3.
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of adjudication of the specific rights of litigants with the broad environmental
view of the jurist.
The phrase, "American system." will refer to that distinctive plan of
civilization, as well as to the consequent mlange of peculiar effects, which in
turn have produced the characteristic features of the sociological situation
existing in the United States today. These effects have followed from putting
into practice a very definite political and juridical philosophy, a less specific,
yet relatively definite body of economic concepts, and a congeries of remedial
formulas, indigenous to the spirit and substance of the Anglo-American common law. From the birth of this system to its present stage of maturity,
sub-ideals and minor techniques have varied from time to time. Indeed overwhelming crises have at times greatly changed its contours. But like all great
institutions, the fundamental substance of the entity and its essential attributes have never changed.
The blueprint of the plan for the American system began to be drawn
up with the Declaration of Independence in 1776. The Constitutional Convention of 1787 continued the work, which reached relative completion with
the adoption of the Bill of Rights. The original principles which underlay
these documents were drawn upon in the elaboration of the first stage of the
American plan. Like any living organism, the American system has grown
more complex with time. Its growth has resulted from the inclusion of
amendments in to the Federal Constitution after the Bill of Rights, from the
expansion of constitutional law, and from periods of re-examination of the
question whether American society was adequately preserving a just and right
relationship between the individual human being, and his political and eco2
nomic government, his fellow man, and his Maker.
In the process of establishing the American system, the role of the
American lawyer was important and decisive. The American Revolution
was essentially a battle between the American legal profession and the English
crown.3 The predominant part which lawyers played in framing the Declaration of Rights and Grievances in 1774, the Declaration of Independence two
years later, and thereafter the federal constitution, is evident not only from
the controlling percentage of lawyers who wrote these documents, but also
from the nature of the specific doctrines therein incorporated, and the implementing institutions. Besides, the historical figure credited with being
the father of the constitution was a lawyer.
In the first place, statistics disclose the numerical superiority of lawyers
in the work of the great revolutionary instruments which initiated the American system. Of the fifty-six signers of the Declaration of Independence
thirty-three were lawyers, or almost sixty percent. The names of Thomas
2Manion,
The American Philosophy of Law (1943) 18 Notre Dame Lawyer
317 at 319-320.
'Bradway, Legal Service for the Indigent (1941) 16 Tenn. L. Rev. 691 at 692.
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Jefferson of Virginia, John Adams of Massachusetts, James Wilson of Pennsylvania, and Charles Carroll of Maryland, are illustrative of some of the
famous lawyer-signers of the Declaration of Independence. Of the fifty-five
delegates who attended the convention which wrote the federal constitution,
at least thirty-three were lawyers. Ten of these had served as state
judges.4 Of the thirty-nine signers of the constitution, twenty-two were
lawyers, or almost fifty-six percent. Among the celebrated lawyers who
signed the Constitution were Rufus King of Massachusetts, James Madison of
Virginia, Alexandre Hamilton of New York, James Wilson and Gouverneur
Morris of Pennsylvania, and John Rutledge and the Pinckneys of South
Carolina.
Secondly, not only statistics, but also the character of the ideals, doctrines
and ideas which were fused together in the historic documents involved in
the genesis of the American system, reveals a lawyer origin. Thus a manifestly
legal theory was invoked by the Continental Congress which drew up the
Declaration of Rights ahd Grievances against the English Crown in 1774.1 It
proceeded on the argument that the actions of the crown were such as to
deprive the colonists of rights to which they were entitled as Englishmen
under the common law of England. Two years later, the lawyer-architects of
the Declaration of Independence and their associates, realizing the futility of
further legal argument, shifted to a normal contention, namely, the justification of revolution by recourse to the broad, juridical doctrine of natural law
rights resting upon an immutable, objectively existent moral regime. 6 The
capacity of the framers of the Declaration of Independence to achieve this
transition is indicative of the breadth and depth of their juristic learning,
and of their political and ethical wisdom.
In the federal constitution, as drawn up by the Convention of 1787,
the hand of the lawyer is evident. The political doctrine of the separation
of powers is worked out in a legal fashion in the first three articles. In the
first article, the senate is given judicial authority in the matter of impeachments, and the limits of this authority are described. The legislative process
of the Congress of the United States is prescribed as well as the extent of
its jurisdiction. Suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
is forbidden except in specific emergency. There is an injunction against
the passage of Bills of Attainder and ex post facto laws. In the second article,
the germ of executive justice may be seen, later given rule content, under
the name of administrative law. In the third article, of course, where the
judicial branch of the federal government is erected, benefit of legal' counsel
is unmistakable. The same may be said as to the fourth article, where for
Warren, The Making of the Constitution (1937) 55.
'See Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law (1921) 100-101; Lawyers Who
Signed the Constitution (1935) 13 The Law Student 29-30.
'Brown, Brendan F., The Bar and the Democratic Process (1939) 13 Temp.
L. Q. 287 at 290. See U. S. Const. Art I §§1-9.
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example, the full faith and credit and the privileges and immunities clauses
are to be found.
It is well known that a number of the states ratified the constitution,
with the assurance that Congress, at its first session, would adopt a Bill of
Rights to guarantee the liberty of the individual against arbitrary government.
by the newly erected federal authority. 7 The Bill of Rights contained two
factors, namely, the enumeration of specific rights, liberties, and immunities,
which were regarded as essential implications from the philosophy that the
sovereign was legally omnipotent, but not morally, and that the sovereign
ruled, but was restrained by the laws of God and nature, and the expressed
choice of precise legal tools, to make workable these rights, liberties and immunities in court and legislature. Both the ideals and techniques of the Bill
of Rights were distinctively legalistic and juristic. Lawyers realized that it
would have been idle, from a practical point of view, merely to have recognized
in vacuo the intrinsic dignity of human personality, and the submission of
the will of the sovereign to an objective juridical and moral order, but not
to have specified the ways in which abstract, ideals were to be translated into
action by legalistic methodology. Other legal means might have been chosen,
but the ones in question have proved adequate to make effective the principle
that law is much more than a command of the sovereign, based on physical
power.
The legal techniques which lawyers wrote into the Bill of Rights, as
distinguished from the rights therein recognized, included among others due
process of law, in reference to life, liberty and property." Curbs were erected
to prevent excessive bail and excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishments. 9 The requirement of a presentment or indictment of a grand jury,
except in clearly defined emergencies, before a person could be held to answer
for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, was established.' 0 The rules of
the common law were to control with respect to the re-examination of a
fact in a federal court, after that fact had been tried by a jury.'1 The contributions of lawyers to the writing of the Bill of Rights are particularly
evident in the Sixth Amendment:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence."
' Warren, Congress, The Constitution and The Supreme Court (1935) 82 fif.
'U. S. Const. Art. V.
'Id. Art. VIII.
,Id. Art. V.
n Id. Art. VII.
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It is true that the legal forms which lawyers incorporated into the Bill
of Rights were largely derived from many intellectual, normative, and experiential elements, borrowed from historical sources, both legal and nonlegal. But creative genius was at work in the activity of assembling these
elements and in inter-relating them, so as to provide an enduring system,
with qualities of both stability and change, adequate to meet the constantly
expanding social needs of a growing population, on the verge of developing
the resources of a mighty continent. In this process the role of the American
lawyer was most influential. The techniques of the Bill of Rights were
inspired by the experience of English constitutional law, and were adaptations
of juridical implements which were being built from Magna Carta in 1215,
down through the period of Coke, and thereafter in the seventeenth and early
part of the eighteenth century. 12 These techniques, however, had never
before been formulated with precision, in an orderly unit.
In the third place James Madison, lawyer and legal philosopher, is
universally recognized as the father of the federal constitution.13 There
are various reasons for this appellation. Thus, he unquestionably exercised
the most controlling influence upon the delegates at the Constutional Convention. 14 There the Virginia plan was presented and was later in substance
molded and developed into what became known as the federal constitution.15
Madison was one of the framers of the Virginia plan, and was a leader in
the work of modifying it at the convention. 16
In general, the political and legal philosophy of Madison was acceptable
to the convention in preference to numerous competing philosophies.'" This
philosophy favored the creation of a national, as distinguished from a federal,
government. He successfully advocated the political theory of the separation
of powers, the election of the President by the people rather than by the legislative branch of government, the creation of a two house legislature, at
least one of which was to be elected by the people, the prevention of en'Warren,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 16, 17. See The Federalist, No 4: "Is it
not the glory of the people of America, that whilst they have paid a decent respect
to the opinions of former times and other nations, they have not suffered a blind
veneration for antiquity, for custom or for names, to overrule the suggestions of their
own good sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their own
experience.
" Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of the United States (1913)
196;
Warren, op. cit. supra note 4 at 57. It is there stated that Madison had studied
theology, and the theory, history, and practice of government.
" Farrand, op. cit. supra note 13 at 197 if.

Id.at 68.

18Burns, James Madison, Philosopher of the Constitution

(1938) 12; Farrand,
op. cit. supra note 13 at 68; Warren, op. cit. supra note 4 at 797-804; Writings of

James Madison (Hunt's ed. 1833) IX, 502, Madison to John Tyler.

" Burns, James Madison, Philosopher of the Constitution (1938)

64 ff.

DIcTA
croachments by the states upon the federal government, and the protection of
each state from encroachments by others.' 8
After the adjournment of the Constitutional Convention, the draft of
the constitution was submitted to the Continental Congress, which presented
it to ratifying conventions in the several states. 19 Madison continued to
father the constitution by joining with Hamilton and Jay, in a series of newspaper letters, known as "The Federalist," to influence public opinion in favor
of adoption. Madison is credited with having written twenty-six of the
20
eighty-five letters, in whole or in part.
Twelve amendments to the constitution were proposed to the legislatures
of the several states by the first Congress, which met in New York, in 1789.21
The first and second of these proposed twelve amendments were rejected by
the States, but the others were approved and became known as a Bill of
Rights. 22 The twelve amendments were based on about a score of amendments offered in the House of Representatives by Madison. 23 These in turn
were preceded by the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776.24 Madison
was chiefly responsible
for the formulation of the religious freedom clause
25
of this declaration.
Finally, the chief account of the proceedings of the convention, adequately recorded and preserved, was reconstructed from a private diary kept
by Madison.2 6 His legal mind was reflected by his ability to preserve the
relevant and significant and by the great value which he attached to written
proceedings which would enable future generations of lawyers to have the
benefit of the views of the delegates of the convention for purposes of interpretation and ascertaining intention. His record was carefully anticipated,
faithfully executed, and meticulously preserved.
Lawyers had a considerable hand, therefore, in fashioning the federal
constitution, with its Bill of Rights, keystone of the political, economic and
juridical structure of the American system. But their devotion and contributions to that system did not terminate there. They continued to guide
the subsequent growth of Constitutional law down to the present time. They
2
made the constitution work. 7
" Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of the United States (1913)
76;
Haines, The Constitution of the United States (1932) 94, 98, 186.
"Warren, The Making of the Constitution (1937) 744.
"Warren, The Making of the Constitution (1937) 788-791; Burns, James
Madison, Philosopher of the Constitution (1938) 14.
Brant, James Madison (1941) 249 ff.
"Idem.
'See 1st Cong., 1st sess. June 8, 1789; I Annals of Congress 433-36; Brant,
James Madison (1941) 249.
UBurns, James Madison, Philosopher of the Constitution (1938) 119 ff.;
Helderman, The Virginia Bill of Rights (1942) 3 W. & L. L. Rev. 225-245.
'Hunt, The Life of James Madison (1902) 12.
"Warren, The Making of the Constitution (1937) 125.
' Haines, The Constitution of the United States (1932) 213-252.
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The record of the American legal profession in the sphere of public
and governmental service may be illustrated by recalling that seventy-five
percent of the Presidents of the United States have been lawyers, i.e., twentyfour out of thirty-two.28 Beginning with the first Congress, there has been
an overwhelming number of lawyers, certainly a plurality, in Congress, and
the state legislatures. Well known indeed is the work of the judges of the
Supreme Court, particularly in the earliest period of the republic, in putting
content into such clauses as due process, equal protection, and law of the
land. In fact, lawyers have had a virtual monopoly of the judicial department of the government. In no other country in the world, no excepting
England, have lawyers exercised such influence in public affairs as they
29
have in the United States.
This nation has survised war, economic depression of vast proportions,
financial panic, hard times and many perilous periods of crisis. In each case
the philosophy of the constitution has been adjusted by lawyers, to constantly
changing sociological conditions, by the invention of ingenius legal forms and
procedures, which have enabled the democratic process to survive. This is
in sharp contrast with the history of the constitutional systems of certain
other countries, which have broken down under the weight of political and
30
economic pressure.
Lawyers did much, therefore, to establish and maintain American
political democracy. Their participation in laying the groundwork of the
American economic order, and in coordinating it with the legal order
is also outstanding. The American society for which the federal constitution
was written postulated an economic system, built upon a capitalistic structure
of private property, and protected by a jural regime, which encouraged free
enterprise and safeguarded the individual from the state, and from other
individuals through rules and percepts of law. Emphasis was upon the
sancity of the property rights of the individual in the acquisition and transfer
of property, in keeping with the pioneer conditions of eighteenth and nine31
teenth century America.
The conceptions of capitalism in the sense of a social policy of allowing
individuals and private corporations to hazard money and wealth in constructive enterprises, to produce more money and wealth, and little or no
governmental regulation, were not the creations of lawyers, but rather of
the national mind. But when in the course of time, public opinion realized
the necessity of a moral, as distinguished from an amoral capitalism, of substituting a socialized idea of private property, in place of the previously exist
ing individualized notion, and of reasonably regulating certain types of
Rose, The Bar as a Governing Caste (1942) 48 W. Va. L. Q. 87 at 88.
Id. at 89.
SoDodd, The Constitution-1787 and Today (1944) 20 Ind. L. J. 55 at 59 ff.
" Cole, Some Observations on the Significance of the American Bill of Rights
(1943) 18 Wash. L. Rev. 90-102.
U
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business activity, lawyers were prepared to readjust the legal order. They did
this in many ways, principally by the formulation of administrative law and
by preserving a balance in the legal sphere between uniformity and certainty
on the one side, and flexibility and discretion on the other.
Administrative law was an important contribution, made by lawyers, to
the task of modifying an obsolete economic order. This phenomenon arose
in consequence of changing social conditions, which rendered archaic the
traditional techniques of the established court system. Executive justice began
as soon as it was conclusively demonstrated that adequate judicial justice was
not possible in certain types of cases, involving such socially necessary activities
as public utilities, railroads, and the like.
In the creation of administrative bodies and agencies, the art of the lawyer
has contributed much to the law applicable and the means followed. There
has been and probably will continue to be disagreement among lawyers as
to the extent of the discretion which should be allowed those making decisions
in the field of administrative law. But there has always been a common area
of agreement as to the necessity of executive justice and of preserving an
equilibrium between it and the philosophy of the federal constitution, which
manifestly aimed to create a government of laws and not of men.
Despite the adoption of a rather socialized view of private property,
and of the policy of a reasonably regulated capitalism, American public
opinion has never veered far from the postulate of a fairly competitive economic order. The American system from its foundation can be characterized,
among other ways, by its recognition of the principle that political democracy
is impossible without a relatively large amount of certainty in the law of the
land, to sustain this competitive regime. 32 For business to thrive and function
adequately, business men must be able to predict with considerable certainty
the behavior of the State, as represented by its executive officers, and by its
courts and legislatures. American lawyers, carrying forward the tradition of
common law, have given busithe legal profession and of the Anglo-American
33
ness this certainty and uniformity.
Examples in the Roman, English and American law, showing the orientation of the legal system toward certainty and uniformity in the light of guiding
concepts supplied by the merchant, trader, business man, and capitalist are
numerous. Thus these qualities resulted when commercial ideas were absorbed by the Roman legal order, beginning with the creation of the Jus
Gentium, in the third century B. C. approximately.3 4 A somewhat paralleling
Barker, Economic Interpretation of the Constitution (1944) 28 Tex. L. Rev.
373-391; O'Mahoney, The Lawyer, The Constitution, and the Modern World (1944)
20 Ind. L. J. 1 at 10.
"See Adler, Law and the Modern Mind; A Symposium, Legal Certainty (1931)
31 Col. L. Rev. 91.
" Brown, Brendan F., The Jurisprudential Basis of Roman Law (1937) 12 Notre
Dame Lawyer 361 at 363 ff. See 1 Voigt, Das Jus Naturale, aequum et bonum und Jus
Gentium de R6mer, 11315, 42, 43, 79-88, 103.
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result occurred when the commercial customs, which were called the Law
Merchant, were made a part of the English Common law by Lord Mansfield,
during the middle of the eighteenth century. 35 Later the Law Merchant was
codified by the English Bills of Exchange Act in 1882. It has been adopted
in more than forty of the English colonies and independencies. 3 6 Today one
of the aims of the Law Revision Committee in England is the attainment
of uniformity.
In the United States lawyers have worked with business men and
bankers, for over fifty years, through the National Conference on Uniform
State Laws in the interests of uniformity and certainty. In 1890, the
American Bar Association recommended the appointment by each state of
commissioners who would draft and recommend uniform state laws. The
first meeting of the commissioners took place in 1892.7 3 All the states
so that now the governor of each state
eventually joined the movement,
38
appoints three commissioners.
In 1895, a committee appointed by the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws drafted a bill to codify the law of negotiable instruments, which
was adopted by the commissioners the following year.39 This law, namely,
the Negotiable Instruments Law, has been adopted by all of the fifty-three
American legislative jurisdictions. 40 The Commissioners have worked out
a series of uniform laws, which include, in addition to the Negotiable Instrument Law, such Acts as the Uniform Partnership Act, the Warehouse
Receipt Act, the Uniform Sales Act, and many others. 41 Not all of the
legislative jurisdictions have accepted all of these laws, but the extent to
which they have been adopted is considerable.
Principles of statutory interpretation have been worked out, in the
matter of uniform state laws, so as to achieve a maximum uniformity.
There is a provision in all save the earliest of these laws that the law "shall
be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose of
making uniform the laws of those states which enact it."142 The aim of this
provision is to influence the courts of one state to follow the interpretation
of other states. Courts of a state may revise their own interpretations if
they differ from the prevalent view taken by the other states.
, Lawson, Uniformity of Laws, A Suggestion (1944) 26 J. Comp. Leg. & Int.
L. 16 at 17-18; Negotiable Instruments Law §§1-50.
" Idem.
"Lawson, Uniformity of Laws, A Suggestion (1944) 26 J. Comp. Leg. & Int.
L. 16 at 20.
Idem.
Brannan, Negotiable Instrument Laws Annotated (6th ed., Beutel) Preface
to First Edition.
"Negotiable Instruments Low §§1-50.
' Idem pp. I-II.
Thus this clause appears in the Uniform Sales Act §74; See Lawson, Uniformity
of Laws, A Suggestion (1944) 26 J. Comp. Leg. & Int. L. 16-27.
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Lawyers have achieved certainty and uniformity also through the
medium of the principle of stare decisis, i. e., by strict adherence to precedent.
According to this principle, the same remedies are always applied to the
same situations of facts. Certainty has resulted from the restatements of
important segments of the law by the American Law Institute. The elements of certainty and uniformity now present in the common law are
survivals from the period of the strict law and the era of the maturity of
law.

43

While the legal profession has recognized the necessity of certainty
and uniformity in law for the benefit of business, it has also admitted the
claims of those whose rights depend upon elasticity in the law. Hence in
the fields of torts, equity, trusts, administrative law, and the like, which
involve a high degree of the normative, the common law has departed from
the element of certainty. But such divergence has been regarded by busi44
ness as consonant with important basic sociological interests.
The legal order has incorporated many commercial concepts, such as
negotiability, the presumption of good faith, and certain notions of what
constitutes property. 46 But conversely, numerous legal concepts have been
prescribed by lawyers for the business world, and have been accepted without
protest by the economic order. Builders of that order have taken over such
relatively arbitrary legal notions as the Statute of Frauds, requiring certain
transactions to be in writing if they are to be given legal effect, Statutes of
Limitations, barring the legal enforcement of rights, the peculiar common
law doctrine of consideration which does not exist in systems derived from
the Roman law, and the anomalous distinctions which have been drawn by
the common law, between personalty and realty. 4

Illustrative of the action

and interaction which have gone on between the legal and business orders
are the exceptions which have been made to the notion of common law consideration, and the building of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
The American public is not well informed as to the efforts of lawyers
to provide legal aid for the poor and the indigent, as a means toward the
end of increasing the usefulness of a legal system, which in the Occidental
tradition constitutes an essential of any social civilization. The tradition of
the American legal profession in this respect was preceded by that of Roman
and English lawyers. 47 The ultimate reason and motive for this gratitous
service has varied according to time and place. Thus civic duty led the
lawyers of ancient Rome to engage in legal aid work, which they regarded
as a privilege. 48 In the Middle Ages, the ecclesiastical bar assumed the duty
"See Pound, The Decadence of Equity (1905) 5 Col. L. Rev. 20 at 23 fif.
"Idem.
"8 Holdsworth, A History of English Law (ed. 1926) 113 fif.
"See, 2 Simes, The Law of Future Interests (1936) 545 if.
"Bradway, Legal Service for the Indigent (1941) 16 Tenn. L. Rev. 691-699.
"Idem.
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of eliminating injustices arising from poverty as a matter of applied Christianity. St. Ives, who died about 1300, an$ St. Thomas More, who was
martyred in 1535, patron saint of lawyers, were celebrated for their charitable legal work. 49 In 1494 a Statute of Henry VII aimed to help those
too poor to avail themselves of legal counsel.50
After the Middle Ages, the idea gradually came to the front that, in
England, legal aid work was fundamentally a professional obligation. 51
This was part of the general idea which has traditionally permeated the
Anglo-American legal profession, namely, that its members should work
primarily for the public good, and only secondarily for the financial gain of
the individual lawyer. It is true of course that at times lawyers have reversed this order. By and large, however, the concept has survived that the
lawyer is a member of a learned profession, which must never ignore its
public responsibilities and leadership. Moved by its faith in the need of
preserving the American system by the practical protection of constitutional
and legal rights of substance and personality, lawyers have been active in
providing able counsel for the poor and indigent, in both civil and criminal
matters, and have given unstinted service to voluntary civic groups and associations.
After legal aid had developed into a professional tradition, the
transition was from unorganized to organized legal aid. Several types of organi~ed legal aid subsequently evolved. These included the creation of bar
association committees, and the like. The American Bar Association has a
standing committee on legal aid. There is the National Association of Legal
52
Aid Organizations.
Organized legal aid has taken the form of legal aid clinics, municipal
bureaus, and departments of a social agency. The American legal profession
has created legal aid bureaus and societies at many key points of the nation.
This assistance parallels that rendered by doctors' hospitals and clinics for
the poor. These bureaus have protected the public in many ways, such as
from trade rackets. 3 The legal aid work in New York and Washington
may be regarded as typical.
According to Harrison Tweed, President of the Legal Aid Society
of New York, in the sixty-ninth annual report of that society, for the
year 1944:
The Legal Aid Society exists in order to give to the poor of
,9Idem.
"See Egerton, Historical Aspects of Legal Aid (1945) 61 L. Q. Rev. 87 ff.
"' See Bradley, Law, Its Nature and Office as the Bond and Basis of Civil So.
ciety (1884) 47; Bradway, Legal Service for the Indigent (1941) 16 Tenn. L. Rev.
691-699.
"Smith, R. H., Legal Aid During the War and After (1945) 31 A. B. A. J.
18 at 19 ff.; Bradway, The Challenge to Organized Legal Aid (1944) 22 Tex. L.
Rev. 327-344.
" Smith, R. H., Legal Aid During the War and After (1945) 31 A. B. A. J. 18.
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Greater New York who have legal troubles (and they number over 30,000
each year) the help they need to solve these troubles just as the free hos54
pitals exist to give the sick the care they need to cure their ills."
From this report, it appears that contributions to this society from lawyers, prior to the year 1944, amounted to more than sixty thousand dollars,
as compared with less than ten thousand dollars from all other sources. The
report states that "Applicants who come to the Society from the armed
services continue to be about one fourth of the total number of applicants."
In New York City there is a group of volunteer lawyers who act as an appeals committee to advise as to the taking of appeals from lower court decisions, especially those of the criminal courts. 55
In the District of Columbia a Legal Aid Bureau, a charitable corporation, was founded in 1932, under the auspices of the Council of Social
agencies to provide legal aid and assistance to those unable to pay therefor.
This bureau became a separate member agency of the Community Chest in
1934. The Bar Association of the District of Columbia has operated a legal
aid desk, since 1937, in the office of the Clerk of the Municipal Court.5 6
The principal type of legal matter handled by these legal aid bureaus
in the past related to domestic relations, particularly marriage and divorce
and habeas corpus proceedings for children; disputes growing out of the
landlord and tenant relation; contracts, especially with installment sellers;
and proceedings to effectuate a change of name.5 7 With impending demobilization, reconversion, and readjustment, problems in these fields will be
,multiplied and others will be added.
Following its very creditable
tradition of public service, the American legal profession may be expected to
fulfill its enlarged obligations in the years which lie ahead.
Legal aid societies have been supplemented by legal aid clinics. The
avowed purpose of the former is to render public servic by aiding the poor,
of the latter to benefit students, as well as the poor. Some of the law
schools have joined in the legal aid movement by offering their facilities and
the energies of a part of their student body to assist the indigent. The Legal
58
Aid Clinic of Duke University is an example.
Lawyers have made available legal assistance, often despite considerable
financial sacrifice, in pursuance of the Sixth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution, which guarantees counsel for defense in all criminal proseId at 4.
Id. at 5.
"See Seventh Annual Report of the Director, Legal Aid Bureau of the District
of Columbia (1939).
" See Report of the President, Sixty-ninth Annual Report of The Legal Aid
Society of New York (1944) at 4.
" Bradway, Legal Aid Clinics Train Young Advocates (1942) 26 J. Am. Jud.
Soc. 14 ff.; Elliott, Legal Clinic versus Legal Aid Society (1936) 8 Am. L. School
Rev. 410 ff.
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cutions and of "the equal protection clause" of the Fourteenth amendment. 59
The rather recent mass sedition trial, held in the national capital, is an example of how counsel was made available gratis to the criminally accused.
Despite the raging of war and the involvement of highly explosive political
factors, the Sixth Amendment was faithfully given effect through the donation of professional services, in some instances leading to great personal
hardship. Even those accused of the most heinous crimes receive benefit of
counsel, appointed by the Court, if they are financially unable to employ
counsel.
The future responsibilities of the bar in the maintenance and extension
of the American system, both at home and abroad, are measurable in terms
of the increasing pressure of forces which constantly strive to substitute opposing modes of social life, radically different civilizations, and above all,
solely materialistic conceptions of the nature of man, and the purpose of
his existence. It is indeed a gratifying sight to observe how the American
system was used as a guide, approximately speaking, when the representatives
of the United Nations met in San Francisco, to draw up the World Charter
and the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The keeping of
world peace has always been the responsibility of lawyers, the designers of
international law and of those juridical institutions which afford the means
by which that law may be translated into action. May American lawyers
ever seek to extend the blessings of the American system to the whole world.

The Lawyer and the Communityt
By

CARL

D.

FRIEBOLIN,

Cleveland*

If you think for a minute that I'm going to apologize for the triteness
of my subject, you're right. The subject was not of my choosing-nor the
speaker, either. If he had not introduced me with such eloquent praise, I
would name the man who is to blame. I can't suppose any subject could be
more vague and less restricted and less definite.
After he had suggested the subject to me, I became curious to learn just
how many times that, or a similar topic had been discussed at Bar Association
Meetings. I suspected there were very many. So I examined the records
for 12 years back. It was quite a task. But I had a lot of time. As most of
you know the Bankruptcy Court has not been busy lately. It has become the
Court that nobody knows. Apparently everybody has money and nobody
" Bradway, The Challenge to Organized Legal Aid (1944) 22 Tex. L. Rev.
327-344.
t Reprinted by permission from the Journal of The National Association of
Referees in Bankruptcy, January 1946. This address was delivered before the Judi.
cial Section of the Ohio State Bar Association, November 29, 1945. It was printed
in the Ohio Law Reporter, Cincinnati, in its issue of December 17, 1945.
* Referee in Bankruptcy since 1916; past president (1931-32) of the National
Association of Referees in Bankruptcy; LL.D., Ohio Wesleyan University.

